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Abstract
The  influence  of government  pressure  on centrar bank  behavior  is examined
for Canada,  France,  the U.K. and  l{est  Germany.  l,/ith  the budget  deficit
pPoxying  for this pressure,  there is evidence  of an overa.l  1 expansionary
effect of the deficjt  on monetary  policy response  to stabilizatjon
obiectives.  Despite  there otherwise  being little  consistency  in the
reaction functions  estimated  acnoss  the four countries, the marked  tendency
is  for policy to become  more  accommodative  at higher levels of the deficir.
Hence  the results point to a potentially  .important  regular.ity  jn the
relationship between  central banks  and  qovernments.
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The  importance  of administration  infruence  on Federar  Reserve  poiicy has
been  jndicated in a number  of studies, including LucKett  and  potts (197g),
who  find evidence  of a shift  in monetary  policy between  each  of the
Eisenhower,  Kennedy-Johnson  and  Nixon-Ford  administrations.  Hamburgen  and
Zwick  (1981, 1982)  find  structurar breaks  in the Federar  Reservers  reaction
function to apparently  cojncide  with presidential regime  changes.
Meanwh'i  1e, analysis of the European  experience  by Hodgman  and  Resek  (19g3)
and  by Wool  ley (i983) suggests  a significant role for administration  regime
changes  that  is not just  confined  to the U.S.  This paper  ana.lyzes  the
influence  of government  pressure  on monetary  policy determination  in
Canada,  France,  the U.K. and  West  Germany.  The  method  of analysis is to
explicitly  allow for an influence  of fiscal  pressure  on the tr-ade-off
weights  applied to the competing  goals  of monetary  policy --  with the
results suggesting  an overall expansionary  effect of this  f.i  scal pressure
across  the four countries.  Indeed,  despite the presence  of considerable
diffenences  in the monetary  reaction functions for the countries in the
sampie,  the cross-country  results reveal a striking  empirical regularity in
the relationship betvreen  monetary  expansion  and  fiscal  pressure.
I.  The  Empirical  Procedure
In the model  of monetary  policy, the relevant pol.icy  instrument  is taken  to
be the rate of growth  of the monetary  base  (DMB).1  A measure  of the
cyclically  adjusted  deficit  (DEF)  is  used  as the proxy  for government
pressure.  The  deficit  is taken  to refrect the desir-ed  por.icy  stance  of the
government,  with higher 
'levers 
of the deficit  implying  increased  pressure-2-
for  the central  bank to  support the pol  icy  trade-off  weights adhered  to by
the government.  0n the basjs of the-argument  that the incentives  facing
politicians  are of a shorter-term  nature  than the incentives  facing
officials  of the central bank,  then it  is  expected  that there would  be a
relative  preference  fo.  expansionary  policy on the part of the government.
Indeed,  the delays  accompanying  the economic  payoffs from  an
anti-inflat'ionary policy may  themserves  be sufficient  to make  such  a pol  icy
relativeiy  less attractive to an institution  with a shorter  time horizon.2
Here,  the more  immediate  effects of contractionary  pol  icy tend to be
confjned  to an adverse  impact  on interest rates and  output.  To incorporate
the influence of fiscal  pressure  from  the government,  the monetary  policy
feedback  rule has  the general  form  given in (1) be.low:3
(1) Dl'lB,=c(DEFa)Xa*t
where  DlilB  is  the nate of  growth of  the monetary  oase,
DEF  is a measure  of the cyclically  adjusted  deficjt,
Xt  is an N x 1 vecton  of lagged  vajues  of the target
a  is a 1x  N vector of coefficients,
e  is an erpor term.
The  nature  of the dependence  of q on the deficit  can  be
simply  by the I inear approximation
va  ri  ab1es,
expressed  most
(2) ot=o1  + orDEF,
which  provides  the basis for the equation  to be estimated  for the four
countri  es i  n the sampl  e.-3-
In seeking  to explain the rate of growth  of the monetary  base  (DMB),  it
is  necessary  at this  point to specifga  set of variabies that might
reasonably  be  expected  to feature in the centrar banksr  reaction function.
Here,  the goals  of price, jnterest rate and  employment  stability  are
represented  by series on the rate of growth  of the GNp  deflator (Dp), the
three-month  treasury  bill  rate (TB) and  the unemployment  rate (UN).  In
order to allow for internatjonal influences, the exchange  rate with the
U.S. (EX)  and  the balance  of payments  (Bp) are added  to the domestic  pol  rcy
variables.  Fina)  1y, the composition  of federal spending,  as reflected in
the rate of growth  of real government  purchases  (DG),  is also introduced
into the model.4 The  response  to these  variables by the Fed  is  itself
taken  to be interactive with the value  of the deficit  divided by trend
GNP." Including iagged  values  of the monetary  base  and  the deficit  takeh
separately,  the equation  to be estimated  has  the form set out below:
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It  can  be seen  that the postulated  dependence  of the feedback  rule
coefficients on the deficit  implies that each  economic  varjable should  be
placed  alongside  a corresponding  interaction term  in the estimation  --
giving a compound  variable with a iag structure synonymous  with that of tne-5-
basic economic  varjable.  The  actual length  of these  lags remains
indeterminate  from  a theoretical perspective,  however;  hence  an appropiate
test procedure  must  be adopted  in order to determjne  the lag va.lues  m, n,
p, q, r and  s.  Here,  Akaikers  (1970)  minimum  fjna1 predictjon error (FpE)
criterion  is appl'ied  to the model  with the maximum  lag length set at six
The  estjmation  itself  is over  quarLerly  daLa  from  1961:1  to 19g3:4,  using
ordi  nary least squares  (OLS).
Appl  ication of the model  to the four countries in the sample  leads  to
considerable  variation in the number  of variabres  serected  by the FpE
criterion.  Moreover,  only in the case  of Canada  are all  the included
va.iables significant at the f.ive  percent  level.  Table  L gives the
significance  of the ful'l set of va.iab'res  in the final  specificat.ion  for
each  country, and  shows  that the sets of interact.ion  terms  are jointly
significant at the five  percent  level onry for canada  and  France. chow
tests showed  the u.K. to feature instabir'ity across  exchange  rate regimes,
indicating that the sample  period should  be split  into the 1961  :!  _  7972:2
fixed exchange  rate period and  1972:3  -  19g3:4  floating exchange  rate
q
period'"  For France  and  west  Germany,  dummy  variabies  were  introduced  in
order to deal with instability  corresponding  to changes  in the political
1
adm  i  ni  stration.'
Although  significance  of many  of the variables is indicated, there are
evidently extensive  d.i  fferences  in the findings for the respectjve
countnies,  both in the detailed country  tables provided  in Appendix  A, and
Results-o-
in the overall sign pattern for the resuits as Iaid out in Table  z.  Note
that in Table  2, the partial  derivative of the monetary  base  with respect
to each  of the economic  variabres  measures  the pol  icy response  observed  at
a zero level of the deficit.  Here,  no ciear picture arises and  there is an
apparent  mixture  of countercyci  ical  and  accommodative  pol  icies being
applied  by the respective  central banks. canada  and  France,  for examp.le,
exhibit a significant countercycrical  (negative)  response  to exchange  rate
and  balance  of payments  movements,  while the U.K. (fixed exchange  rate
period) and  lriest  Germany  feature a positive response  to the internationa.l
variables represented  in their  reaction functions.
However,  there js  in fact  support  for the paper,s  underlying  hypothesis
that the shorter time horizon  of the administration  would  lead to
relatively  more  weight  being  placed  on expansionary  policy than is the case
with the central bank.  This finding stems  from  the signs  on the
interaction terms,  which in Tabre  2 are given  by the partiar derivatives of
the right-hand-side  coefficients with respect  to the deficit.  These
partials  reflect  how  the response  to each  of the economic  variables is
affected by an increase  in the deficit,  and  it  is  notable  that in eleven
cases  out of a totar of fifteen  (73%)  the observed  effect of the deficit  is
indeed  expansionary.  That is,  over all  four countries, Lhere  is a tendencv
for the response  to the erements  in the objective funcLion  to become  more
accommodative  at higher levels of the deficit.  For  canada  and  France  --
the t\40  cases  rvhere  the interaction effect  is  statistically  significant --
sjx out of the seven  terms  are positive.S
It  remajns  true that the broad  range  of results contained  jn the
findings of this paper  necessarily  limit  its  contr,ibution  towardsI
-7-
uncrerstanding  the monetary  policy process  in the four countries.  At the
same  time, such  large variations jn lllonetary  po.i  icy reaction functjon
estimates  obtained  for different  countries  are in fact a famiriar feature
of much  other cross-country  work  (Gordon  (1977)  and  Willett  et al  (19g6),
for example). indeed,  the primary  basis of the present  paper  .is  that,
despite the aforementioned  probiems  with the resurts, it  is nevertheless
possible  to discern a pronounced  regularity in the relationship between
central banks  and  governments.  In essence,  the nesults suggest  that
accelerations  in the rate of monetary  expansion  may  be attributed, at least
in part'  to the demands  that governments  may  prace  on their  centrar banks.
Moreover,  higher  budget  deficjts  are specifically  seen  as inducing  a more
accommodative  response  to movements  in economic  variables.
III.  Concl  us  ions
The  analysis has  modeled  mohetary  policy as the joint  product  both of
central bank  trade-off weights  and  of government  pressure,  with the iatter
proxied  for by the observed  level of the defic,it.  The  tendency  for the
response  pattern to become  more  accommodative  at higher 1eve.l  s of the
deficit  provides  evjdence  of a marked  empirical regularity that is
'i  I  lustrated in the resurts for the intennationar  sample. I_n  view  of the
structural 'instabil  ity  and  insignificance of the interact.ion  terms  in
cent.ain  of the countries, further research  paying  more  attention to the
role of the defjcit  may  lead to a better understanding  of cross_country
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This paper  draws  on  my  ph.D.  djssertation entitied  'The  Interaction of
Central  Bank  Behavior  with Fjscal policymaking  and  the politjcal
Eusiness  Cyc'le:  A Muiti-Country  Study,r Houston,  Tex.: University of
Houston,  December  1985.  I wourd  iike  to thank  rvri  ke cox and  steve  Green
for advice  and  comments  that greatly assisted  prepanat.ion  of the paper
in its  present  fot.m. I  am  also pleased  to acknowledge  prior  suppont
from  Gerald  Dwyer,  my  d'i  ssertation chairman,  and  the other members  of.
my  dissertation committee. The  views  expressed  are those  of the author
and  do not necessarily  reflect  the posjtions of the Federal  Reserve
Bank  of Dallas  or the Federal  Reserve  System.
Use  of this monetary  measure  is  supported  by Lothian  (1976),  who
stresses  the relative constancy  of the characteristics of high_powered
money  across  countrjes  and  across  time.
In terms  of the reputational impl  ications di  scussed  by Earro  and  Gordon
(  1983a,  b), the  pol  icymakerr  s di  scount  rate i  s .in  fact crucial i  n
determining  whethen  the policymaker  forgoes  the short-term  benefits
available from  unanticipated  infration  in order to secure  the gain from
low average  inflation  over the longer  haul  ,  In the Barro  and  Gordon
model  , it  is  shown  that,  ceteris paribus, the 
'iover 
the d.i  scount  rate.
the closer the outcome  to the moder's  optjma1  solution in which  the
policymaker  follows a zero money  growth  nu1e. A higher  discount  rate
for the government  rerative to the central bank  wourd  in this case  be
consistent  with preference  for a relatively  more  rapid rate of money
growth,  and  in turn wjth an expansionary  impetus  for the fiscal
pressure  applied  by the govennment.-11-
3.  See  Burdekjn  (1986)  for formal  development  of the underlying  mode)
associated  with this equation. the approach  may  be rerated  to that of
Blinder (1983),  who  also allows for  interaction between  the set of
coefficients in the monetary  policy reaction function and  the budget
deficjt.  Elinder, however,  addresses  the possible  impact  of central
bank  economic  goals  on  deficit  accommodation;  and  deals therefore  with
the reverse  of the djrection of causaljty considered  here.
4.  This accords  theoretjcal  iy with certain optimal public finance
considenations  r"aised  by Barro  (1979), and  accords  empiricai.ly  with the
signjficant role for this variable found  by Bljnder (19g3).
5.  A problem  here i's the lack of internationa.l  data on the full_employment
deficit  and  on trend GNp. Although  in the latter  case  an acceptable
proxy  can  be obtained  by regressing  the 1og  of rea.l  GNp  on a time
trend, the best alternative to the full-employment  deficit  was  found
simply  to be observed  (unadjusled)  deficjt.  Using  the U.S. as a basis
of comparison,  the observed  deficjt  fn fact nas  a greater correration
with the offjcial  rcyclical1y adjusted' deficit  than does  a proxy
measure  constructed  by tak.ing  the residuals from  a regression  of the
defjcit  on current and  lagged  real GNp. Use  of the unadjusted  deficit
is further justjfied  by the fact that it  has  r)atively  little  effect on
the sign pattern for the U.S.  as given in Burdekin  (19g6),  even  though
there is a reduced  overalI goodness  of fit.  (The  R is 0.63  with the
official  measure,  0.53  with the unadjusted  def  .icit and  0.45  with the
constructed  def  i  ci  t..  )
6'  In an initiar  application  of the FpE  criterion  to the furl  sample,  only
the deficit  and  unemployment  rate were  selected  for the u.K.  Allowance
was  then made  for a role of the international varjables that might  be7.
-12-
specific to the separate  sub-samples.  Here,  a reapplication  of the FpE
cr.iterion revealed  both the exchange  rate and  balance  of payments  to be
significant for the 1961:1  :1972:2  period, and  the balance  of payments
alone  fo be significant for the j.972:3  -  l9g3:4 period.  The  final
specifications  for the two u.K. sub-samples  include  these  international
variables as well as the deficft  and  unemploymenr  rat,e.
Chow  tests were  applied .in  order to test  for  stabil.ity over French
presidential administrations,  and  the results indicated  stnuctural
breaks  corresponding  to the terms  of pompidou  and  Gjscard,  For  Vlest
Germany,  instabil ity was  indicated  over the 1969:4  -  1972:4  and  I973:l
-  7976:4  inter-election periods.  Dummy  variables  were  defined  for each
of these  West  Ger-man  inter-election periods, and  also for the two
French  presidential adminjstrations  noted  above.
The  statistjcal  insignificance  of the interaction terms  for the U.K.
and  |.tlest  Germany  clearly is evjdence  against the ascribed  role for
fiscal  pressure  in infruencing  central bank  behavior.  There  is also a
general  insignificance of the economic  variables present  in the
reactjon functions for these  two countries.  (The  only exception  to
this  js the balance  of payments  variable for West  Germany).  The
particular problems  in explaining  monetary  poljcy in the U.K.  and  tdest
Germany  does,  however,  almost  heighten  the importance  of the overal  I
expansionary  effect of the deficit  as a trend discernible across  the
f  u)  i  sampl  e.
The  cross-country  evidence  may,  however,  be set alongsjde  the results
presented  in Burdekin  (1986),  which  suggest  an important  role fon
fiscal  pressure  in explaining  monetary  policy in the U.S.
8.
t.Aka  i  ke, Hi  rotug  u,
the I  n  sti tute
-IJ-
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Appendi  x A
TABLE  A1
Resul  ts for Ca  n  ada
Coefficient
Dependent  Variabl  e DltlB
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Resui  ts for France
Coef  f  i  c  ient
Con  stant
DMB(-1)
DMB(  -2  )
DMB(-3)
DG(-1)
DEF.  DG(  -1)
uN(  -  1)
uN(  *2  )
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0.009
-0.006




DW  = 1.89
t-Statistic
o = 0.044
one  for the Pompidou
zero  e1se,
one  for the Giscard














































Note: POMP  is a dummy  variable set equal  to
admi  ni  strati on (  1969:3  -  1974:2)  , and
GiSC  is a dummy  variable se! eoual  to
administration  (1974:3  -  1981  :2), andDependent  Vani  abl  e DMB
Sampi  e 1961:7  -  1972:2
R = 0.83
Sample  1972:3  - 1983:4
Con  stant
DEF(  -1  )
DEF(  -2)
uN(  -1)
uN(  -2  )
DEF.UN(-1)
DEF.  uN(  -2 )
BP(-1)
NFtr RDT  -1 \
2
R  = 0.60
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TABLE  A3
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Resul  ts for West Germany
Dependent  Variable Dl4B
Sample  1961:1  -  1983:4
2
R = 0.49
Note:  D6972  is a
pe  ri od of
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dummy  variable set equal  to one  for
1969:4  -  7972:4,  and  zero e)se,
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1973:1  -  !976:4, and  zero else.
Constant
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of the Internat  iona  l Data
8P  data  series  are taken  fron OECD  (19S0,  1984);  w.ith  the
in general  , being  obtained  from  the IFS  tape.  However,  for
national  accounts  data  ape  from  OECD  (1972)  and  0EC0,
for
in
Canada  js by courtesy  of the
Bank  of Canada  Review,  various
Bank  of Canada.  (Available fron 1967:Z
i  ssues.  )
The  exact  definit.ions  of the data series follow below,  with the IFS
I  j  ne numbers  where  appropri  ate:
(1)  DMB  = los (MBASE/t'tBAsE(-1))
where  MBASE  is the (unadjusted)  monetary  base  (1ine 14).
(2)  DEF  = (-1 x BUDGET)/TRNDGNp
where  BUDGET  is the (unadjusted)  government  budget  surplus  (1.i  ne
80),
TRNDGNP  is trend GNp;  constructed  by taking the antilog of the
filted  values  from  a regression  of the logarithm  of real GNp  (line
99a.r --  for U.K. only, line 99b.p)  on a constant  and  a time trend
--  which  are then  multipiied by pRICE  to put the series on a
nomi  nal basi  s.
(3)  DG = log (GOV/GOV(-1))
where  GOV  is  real government  consumption  (1ine 91f div.ided  by
PRrCE).
(4)  DP  = los  (pRIcE/pRICE(-1))
where  PRICE  is the cNp  deflator (1ine 99a  divided by line 99a.r __
for U.K. only, lines 99b  and  99b.p  respect.ively).-46-
(5)  UN  is the unemployment  l"ate  --  for  France  on1y,  the numbers
unemployed  (in mi1'l  ions).
(6)  TB  is the three-month  treasury  bjll  rate (Canada  and  U.K., line
60c).
(7)  CL  is the call  money  rate (France  and  West  Germany,  i.ine  60b).
(8)  EX  is the exchange  rate wjth the U.S. (1ine a.e --  for U.K.
on1y,  line a.g).
(9)  BP  is  the balance  of payments  deficit  on current account  --  for
France  only, the balance  of trade.
The  only seasona'l  iy adjusted  series apart from  the national accounts
data are UN  (except  for West  Germany)  and  Bp  (France  only).